Social Welfare, the Neo-conservative Turn and Educational Opportunity

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The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State

Moving Up and Out: Poverty, Education, and the Single Parent Family

This essay examines the educational opportunities of people in poverty who receive social welfare assistance. The dominant political theory underlying social policy (including education policy) in the United States has evolved from 1960s and 1970s welfare liberalism into 1980s and 1990s style neo-conservatism—a theory that embraces principles of the market and individual liberty as paramount social values. Against this backdrop, I review two recent books that provide compelling evidence for this turn and I call for increased understanding of the relationship between social welfare policies and higher education opportunities for those in poverty.

I THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE TURN

Michael B. Katz’s comprehensive The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State and Lori Holyfield’s timely Moving Up and Out: Poverty, Education, and the Single Parent Family suggest that the erosion of equality of educational opportunity is a central issue within social policy,1 as well as one part of a much larger movement away from a political concern for equality and social justice to a concern with free markets and liberty. Or to put it in more popular terms, the erosion of equality of educational opportunity is one part of the movement away from liberalism to neo-conservatism. As I review these books by Katz and Holyfield in this essay, I will provide some context for their analyses and examine the neo-conservative turn that is resulting in circumscribed educational opportunities for people in poverty.2 Both Katz and Holyfield,
albeit in very different ways, provide compelling evidence for the neo-conservative turn.

The dominant political theory underlying social policy (including education policy) in the United States has evolved from 1960s and 1970s welfare liberalism into 1980s and 1990s style neo-conservatism—a theory that embraces principles of the market and individual liberty as paramount social values. Sociologists Madeleine Arnot, Miriam David and Gaby Weiner (1999) observed a similar situation in Britain. They theorised that there was a ‘meritocratic era’ after World War II, from the 1940s and onward, characterised by ‘a strong commitment to equality of opportunity and individual advancement’ and an era of egalitarian and ‘feminist politics’ during the 1960s and 1970s (p. 52). Both of these gave way in the 1980s to a Margaret Thatcher-led backlash against a ‘collectivist approach to social welfare and the economy’ (Arnot, David and Weiner, 1999). Katz analyses the shifts mentioned by Arnot, David and Weiner and alludes to the political turn to the Right.

Although Katz spends fewer than ten pages on a section called ‘Welfare and the Conservative Ascendancy’ (p. 17), this is the heart of his argument. Katz posits that the welfare state has been redefined as a consequence of ‘[t]he resurgence of conservatism in late-twentieth-century politics and culture’ (p. 17). According to Katz, ‘[t]he movement drew strength from its affiliation with evangelical and fundamentalist Protestantism, from ideas disseminated by conservative think tanks underwritten by big money and from the perceived failures of government and the collapse of communism. Conservative policy was one among the possible responses to real problems’ (pp. 17–18).

But what are the core disagreements between neo-conservatives and liberal egalitarians? How do those on either side of social welfare debates conceptualise important notions like equality so that they end up with quite different policy prescriptions?

Neo-conservative theory holds that poverty and social problems are the primary responsibility of the individual, not society. Accordingly, if poverty results from individuals’ own free choices, it is their own responsibility, in which case a state obligation to provide economic equality does not make sense (Gilder, 1993; Mead, 1992; Murray, 1984; Nozick, 1974). The premise that poverty somehow results from persons’ own choices is problematic in that the notion of choice cannot be taken at face value. The choices that individuals make are often circumscribed by the historical and social context within which they operate. In American society the myth exists that poverty is deserved. This unexamined myth makes poverty seem somehow natural or inevitable; people get what they deserve. This is perhaps not surprising, given America’s cultural roots in the Protestant work ethic and the concomitant sensibility that poverty and other social problems are the fault of the individual. US social policy reflects these beliefs. Social welfare policies have thus been seen increasingly as an unnecessary burden on society.

Neo-conservatives do not necessarily ascribe to a monolithic theoretical position. Rather, they are, as educational theorist Michael Apple (1996) remarked, ‘a complex assemblage of different tendencies many of which are
in a tense and unstable relationship to each other’ (p. 45). Nevertheless, in
general, neo-conservatives are most concerned with individuals’ liberty and
right to choose, freedom from government interference, personal responsi-

bility, merit and the free market. Missing from these priorities are equality
and social justice. As Apple (1996) pointed out, neo-conservatives grant the
concept of social justice little value. For them, individuals—not social groups
or social movements—are of paramount importance. Yet, even though there
may be little discussion of such concepts as social justice, that does not mean
that theories of justice are missing from the overall neo-conservative agenda.
Implicit though they may be, they affect how neo-conservatives conceptua-

lise significant concepts such as equality, choice and desert.

Social scientist Charles Murray’s (1984) Losing Ground exemplifies
scholarship that presents empirical evidence to bolster the neo-conservative
perspective. Addressing the causes of poverty in the face of federal social
programmes, Murray concludes that anti-poverty programmes have failed
because policy has ignored the popular wisdom that people are not
naturally moral or hard working. Murray’s solution is to abolish anti-

poverty policies and programmes entirely. Ultimately, he dismisses the
idea that there are systemic factors that make it difficult for many poor
people to pull themselves out of poverty. Neo-conservative scholars such
as Murray (1984) and Mead (1992, 1997) view anti-poverty policies as
having a negative impact on work motivation and traditional families.

Scholars who hold an egalitarian perspective find much with which to
take issue in Murray’s central claims. Sociologist William Julius Wilson
(1996), for one, sees Murray’s claims as part of an American ‘belief
system that deemphasizes the social origins and social significance of
poverty and welfare’ (p. 159). Thus individual factors such as lack of
industriousness, lack of ambition, loose morals, lack of motivation, poor
work ethic and lack of ability are emphasised, rather than factors such as
low skills, inadequate education, low wages, lack of job availability and
racism. Indeed, survey data collected in 1969, 1980 and 1990 found that a
majority (over 90 per cent) of those surveyed cited the explanation for
poverty as lack of effort on the part of the poor (Wilson, 1996). In The
Price of Citizenship (2001) and The Undeserving Poor (1989), Katz works
to refute such ideas. He posits that throughout history, mainstream
American society has demonised poor people. They have been seen as
other, underclass and unworthy of mainstream success.

The ideological perspectives of politicians, policy makers and educators
influence their policy decisions. For example, if poverty is seen as an
individual attribute, certain policies will appear to make sense. If poverty
is seen as a problem caused by society’s structures, then different policies
will make sense. Thus, changes in US social welfare policy made in 1996
reflect the neo-conservative view of poverty as an individual attribute.

II REFORMING WELFARE POLICY

The crucial connection between the books by Katz and Holyfield is the
1996 federal welfare reform law,3 which seems to have been a major
impetus for Katz’s study and underscores the importance of Holyfield’s advocacy for postsecondary educational opportunities for welfare participants. The law, entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), constituted a shift in the philosophy behind 1960s poverty relief from benefits and safety nets for poor families to a focus on personal responsibility, with aid contingent upon work activity. Its major effect was to require work participation of anyone receiving public assistance in the form of cash benefits. Related to education, another important consequence of the law was to restrict the ability of welfare participants to pursue post-secondary education. Unless a state chooses to sanction some kind of special programme, the only education option that would count as a work activity is one year or less of vocational education. There are no stipulations for participants who aspire to post-secondary education leading to a degree or other competencies. If an adult receiving monetary assistance were to attend college and participate in sanctioned work activity for fewer hours per week than required, that person’s cash benefits would be reduced accordingly. What happens, in effect, is that in order to classify any higher education as a work activity, states must say that it falls under skills training related to employment, education directly related to employment or short-term vocational education.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 1996 initial authorisation (and current renewal process) of PRWORA was conducted without any serious examination of the political theories that underlie the policy. This signals a dire need to step back, to uncover and understand the dominant theories of justice that implicitly drive social welfare policy. Both books discussed in this essay provide evidence for this need. Let us consider first what historian Michael B. Katz offers in this regard.

III THE HISTORY OF WELFARE AND THE RISE OF MARKET VALUES

In *The Price of Citizenship*, Katz does an impressive job of bringing the historical record to bear on current social welfare policy. He defines welfare very broadly, focusing on the conglomeration of social policies that makes up the American welfare state. The book’s twelve chapters go into deep, painstaking detail on the story of the American welfare state, its controversies, policies, legislation, major players and ideological issues. Katz begins by citing a quote from T. H. Marshall:

In 1950 the British sociologist T. H. Marshall described the triumph of the welfare state as ‘the subordination of market price to social justice.’ In recent decades that trajectory has been reversed. While the tension between capitalism and equality remains as powerful as ever, today it is social justice that is subordinate to market price (p. 1).

Katz then spends 400 or so pages lamenting the fact that market ideals are no longer subordinate to social justice ideals in the US. He documents the rampant application of market thinking and models to social policy. From
a historically informed vantage point, he explains that the passage of the 1996 welfare reforms was symbolic of a massive redefinition of the American welfare state. These reforms, Katz argues,

signaled the victory of three great forces – the war on dependence, the devolution of public authority, and the application of market models to public policy ... By tightening the links between benefits and employment, the late-twentieth-century welfare state has stratified Americans into first- and second-class citizens and undermined the effective practice of democracy. Everywhere market price has superceded social justice (pp. 2–3).

Katz’s treatment of the subject is exhaustive. After a number of pages defining what the American welfare state actually is, and tracing the sources of poverty and inequality in American cities, each chapter focuses on one aspect of the welfare state and how that aspect ties in with the ‘three great forces’ at work in the changing welfare state.

The war on dependence, Katz argues, can be seen in the Family Support Act of 1988, urban policies and the way that injured, disabled and unemployed people have been treated. Katz outlines the history of the Family Support Act and shows that such a welfare policy would be ineffective because ‘it offered little hope of reducing poverty or promoting lasting economic independence’ (p. 58). He points out that the 1980s tellingly brought a sense that welfare programmes needed reform, rather than a sense that it was time to renew the struggle against poverty, inequality and urban joblessness. Without denying that the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programme needed to be changed, Katz argues that Murray’s and others’ ways of making that change has been destructive and unjust overall:

In the new social Darwinism that informs social policy, not much sympathy cushions the losers in the competitive global marketplace. Rather, they bear responsibility for their condition and their uselessness merits only the smallest support. American social programs label those individuals they treat meanly or exclude as morally suspect or unworthy (p. 195).

The problem Katz describes is not only a lack of sympathy, but also a neo-conservative conception of justice that allows for and justifies the lack of sympathy and the reinvented welfare state about which Katz theorised.

Regarding the devolution of authority from the federal government, Katz cites the trend of powerful state governors as leaders in welfare reform. He notes that devolution began in the 1970s under President Richard Nixon as the administration allowed scepticism about the power of the federal government to permeate policy decisions. Katz uses concrete examples of individual policy, governors and mayors to illustrate the social phenomena he describes, whereby an increase in state power led to a decrease in federal authority.
Katz makes perhaps the strongest case for the claim that social policy has come to be dominated by market models. The embrace of the market is exemplified by the large role that independent agencies and private charities play within the social welfare system and by the debates over social security and health-care reform. He points out that a determined group is interested in changing the social security system into a market-based programme. The health-care system has become a market-based programme with the advent of health maintenance organisations and the rejection of universal healthcare. Unlike other industrialised countries, since the 1950s the US system of health and medical insurance has linked benefits to employment. By the 1970s, keeping costs down rather than keeping people healthy functioned as the top priority of federal health-care policy. Despite the market model, health-care costs in the US continue to rise, propelling calls for a potentially more cost-effective universal system once again.

The anti-poverty programmes of the 1990s and the passage of PRWORA were indicative of all three of Katz’s great forces. Katz utilises the historical record to gain an understanding about public assistance—how it came to be and how it became synonymous with welfare and thus clouded the actual welfare state, which he calls ‘neither public nor private, but an enormous structure that combines the two. A public branch with three divisions – public assistance, social insurance and taxation – intersects in a myriad of ways with a huge private branch divided between the independent sector – charities and social services – and employee benefits’ (p. 9).

Katz’s analysis is unsparing and he reserves special venom for market fundamentalists. He argues that AFDC programmes were casualties of political ideological disagreements. As evidence, he cites the fact that AFDC was not a very expensive programme: ‘It is hard to imagine a less expensive way to keep millions of nonworking people alive’ (p. 318). Ultimately, Katz denounces the negative consequences of tying citizenship to labour, asking: ‘What were the consequences of tying citizenship to work in the regular labor market? After the end of welfare, who, really, was a citizen?’ (p. 340).

The book’s final chapter gives Katz’s answers to those two questions. After analysing the larger issues that connect the various social policies and programmes he examined in chapters three to ten, he returns to T. H. Marshall:

While the legacy of T. H. Marshall still influences discussions of the links between welfare states and citizenship, the legacy of William Beveridge, architect of the British welfare state, remains visible in the politics of welfare policy. For Beveridge, the rights of citizenship grew out of a contract centered on work… Work has proved even more important to American than to British or European ideas of the welfare state, which have made benefits less contingent on employment (p. 347).

This is the crux of the connection between welfare policy and educational opportunities. If social benefits for people in poverty are tied to their work...
activities, then opportunities for education necessarily are eroded. The redefinition of the US welfare state posited by Katz is tightly linked with Lori Holyfield’s concerns about educational opportunities more generally.

IV WELFARE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Should welfare recipients have the opportunity to pursue post-secondary education? The answer seems straightforward enough, yet as noted earlier, US welfare policy places substantial obstacles in the way of welfare participants going to college. This is the problem that Lori Holyfield examines in *Moving Up and Out*. Holyfield has written a book about single parents, poverty, welfare and education. Her own story fostered her interest in the intersection of these complex issues: she was a high-school drop-out struggling as a head of household who relied on public assistance at times and eventually completed her GED and later a PhD in Sociology. She is now a tenured faculty member, teaching at the University of Arkansas. In the book’s seven chapters, Holyfield tells the overlapping stories of single mothers who are college students, an Arkansas scholarship programme for single parents and the socio-political climate of welfare reform and anti-poverty policy. Her own story, as a recipient of scholarships from the Arkansas Single Parent Scholarship Fund provides the backdrop for her analysis. In *Moving Up and Out*, Holyfield unabashedly advocates higher education opportunities for people in poverty. Her aim is to share the stories of scholarship recipients as they struggle to leave poverty. As Holyfield explains, ‘I wanted to know if obtaining an education was as much of a life-changing event for others as it was for me’ (p. xv). In addition, she hopes that the scholarship fund can be replicated elsewhere. According to Holyfield, ‘[f]or most poor single mothers, just the opportunity to obtain a post-secondary education is an empowering first step in their journey toward independence’ (p. xiii). The scholarship programme is almost more important for its symbolism (than for the small cash award it provides) because it sends these students the message that someone in their community believes in them and their abilities. Overall, the book provides a no-nonsense, accessible approach to the relationship between poverty, welfare, education and social mobility.

Holyfield’s research was composed of interviews with 41 single mothers who are students or have finished their studies; and interviews with 12 women who dropped out of college. In addition, it provides an example of an apparently small scale, easy-to-manage programme that has made a big difference in the lives of poor single parents interested in pursuing post-secondary education. Unfortunately, the research participants’ stories are often too brief. Holyfield claims to interweave her participants’ stories in each of the book’s first five chapters, but really we learn little about their real lives.

In addition to providing a context for an examination of poverty and a brief history of welfare policy in the USA, Holyfield discusses the current context as well: ‘Many of the single mothers who participated in the
research for this book could not have finished their educations under current welfare law and the limitations of Clinton-era reforms’ (p. 15). She then focuses on US welfare policy and recent legislation and how educational opportunities are affected. She points out that the major barriers to success are inadequate or nonexistent child support; inadequate or unaffordable childcare; transportation issues; and an irrational welfare system that interprets participants’ needs for them, often incorrectly (see Fraser, 1989).

In addition, she examines the stereotypes and social representations with which welfare participants often must contend, including this interesting finding:

What surprised me the most during my research was the degree to which so many of the women shared these [negative] images of themselves. In retrospect, I should have anticipated this. After all, the negative messages about welfare carry with them a surge of moral legitimation from the media to politicians to even the clergy (p. 38).

Unfortunately, Holyfield, while telling us that women feel this way, does not offer much evidence from her data to this effect. There is little insight from the voices of the single mothers interviewed about ‘the obstacles that led them to drop out or the benefits education has brought to them’ (pp. xvii–xviii). We learn little more than that dropping out was a bad idea, or with a college education one could get a better job that paid more money. Again, Holyfield reports what the participants thought. We do not hear their unique voices, or any thick description of their lives and struggles.

Nonetheless, Holyfield successfully explains just how poverty is a social phenomenon, rather than a personal problem. She points out, ‘when a social phenomenon affects significant segments of a population, it is no longer a personal trouble but instead becomes a social issue’ (p. 47). She also explores the relationship between education and social mobility. Her main argument is that education needs to be accessible for poor people. The argument hinges on the notion that post-secondary education allows poor single parents to strive for and attain high-paying and high-status jobs and careers that would otherwise be out of reach. This, Holyfield argues, provides people in poverty with the opportunity to leave poverty—and welfare support—for good, which justifies using public funds toward welfare participants’ educational expenses.

Lastly, Holyfield details how to start a Single Parent Scholarship Fund and concludes by providing her own policy recommendations regarding welfare requirements and participants’ access to and opportunity for post-secondary education. The conclusion is a disappointment. Her work is advocacy research. Yet, it feels as though Holyfield has tried to avoid difficult political discussions. For instance, regarding the 1996 welfare reforms, she noted: ‘The success of this policy will depend greatly upon the skills and educational welfare recipients take with them into the workplace. Otherwise they will move from welfare poor to working poor, a group that federal policy has yet to address’ (p. 106). But she offers no
discussion about why this might be, or why perhaps such an outcome is precisely the reason for the current policy. Holyfield regards current welfare policy as ‘dangerous’, but does not examine or discuss the political factors behind it. The crucial point of her whole argument receives only one paragraph’s worth of attention, which fails to capture the complexity of the issue: ‘The work requirements mandated in the 1996 welfare-reform law preclude most welfare recipients from getting a post-secondary education... This policy will have to change to make a real difference in the lives of single parents and their children’ (p. 117). In the current political climate of the neo-conservative turn, that conclusion is just not forceful enough.

The best of Moving Up and Out presents a partial solution to Katz’s worries: the idea that real educational opportunities can best help poor people (in Holyfield’s research, specifically poor single parents) reach the goals of reducing poverty and fostering economic independence, that are, according to Katz, goals more sensible and just than merely putting people to work. Both Holyfield and Katz maintain that moving welfare participants to a job—any job—may succeed in getting people off of welfare rolls, but does little to move people toward real financial independence and a good quality of life.

V CHOICE, VOICE AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

In the spring of 2003, President George W. Bush signed a bill that provided a tax cut to many people in the United States. Notably left out were the working poor. In order to cut costs, the Bush administration and Republican Congressional leaders decided that families with incomes from $10,500 to $26,625 would not be eligible to receive the expanded child tax credit of up to $400 (Klein, 2003). This is a recent example of the neo-conservative turn in social policy, which underscores Michael B. Katz’s argument that the welfare state has been reconceptualised. Apple (1996) contends that instead of just studying poor people, it might be useful and justifiable to study the ‘nearly ‘pathological detachment’ of the affluent and of their allies in government and neoconservative intellectual and policy circles’ (p. 10). In The Price of Citizenship, Katz attempts that task. Although he does not specifically decry a ‘neoconservative turn’ that has led to the redefined welfare state, his book provides rich historical evidence of its existence. Holyfield’s Moving Up and Out brings these issues to bear on education.

It is not sufficient to call for better educational opportunities for people in poverty. We need a deeper understanding of the theories and concepts that underlie dominant policy positions. Such an understanding can help clarify what the neo-conservative turn means for our insight into and commitment to equality of educational opportunity. As philosophers have argued, inequality in and of itself need not be objectionable (Ryan, 2002); nevertheless, equality is of paramount value within liberal egalitarian theory. The contemporary liberal perspective advocates a participatory
The concept of equal educational opportunity requires that welfare laws allow recipients to attend college if they have such aspirations. Nevertheless, US welfare policy assumes a neo-conservative conception of equality of educational opportunity. Proponents of the law argue that welfare participants do have an equal opportunity to attend college, for it is their own choice to accept money from the state. Yet, that so-called choice limits their options for post-secondary education. They could just as easily choose not to apply for public assistance and then would be free to pursue education. As such, proponents of the welfare law would argue, there are no formal barriers.

However, US society privileges certain starting places over others, even though they may not be justifiable by appeal to inherent worth or desert. No one chooses to be born into poverty; yet such brute bad luck profoundly affects one’s resources. What most divides neo-conservatives and liberal egalitarians is the importance they attribute, respectively, to the social context and the kinds of opportunities—the context of choice—it creates (Kymlicka, 1991).

Another major division between neo-conservatives and liberal-egalitarians is the concern they display for the voices of the people most affected by social policy. Poor people were not meaningfully included in the debate over or formulation of the 1996 welfare law (Lacireno-Paquet, 1999). Neither Katz nor Holyfield addresses this. Writing well before the 1996 welfare legislation, Nancy Fraser (1989) noted that since most welfare recipients are female heads of households, it is important to consider feminist struggles surrounding welfare policy. Fraser points out that welfare reform ought to ‘secure the political status of women’s needs, that is, to legitimate women’s needs as genuine political issues as opposed to ‘private’ domestic… matters’ (Fraser, 1989). As policy makers interpret participants’ main need as the need for immediate, paying jobs, they discount the need of participants to advance their education in such a way that they have a better chance of leading their families out of poverty. Such attention to the actual voiced needs of welfare participants would counter what Fraser calls the ‘antiparticipatory, monological practices of the welfare system’ (p. 158).

If the perspectives of welfare recipients had been meaningfully included in the policy debate, policy makers might have learned that welfare participants often have neither the resources nor the chance to negotiate their own educational opportunities. Let me be clear that I am not arguing here that higher education should be a right. What I am saying is that poor people have the right to a real opportunity to pursue higher education. While educational opportunities are admittedly not the answer to the problem of poverty, college attendance and graduation provide a promising path out of poverty. If one believes in the ideal of equality as a hallmark of a liberal democratic society, then how can one accept the
federal policies examined by both Katz and Holyfield, policies that serve to limit equality of educational opportunity? The answer is that one cannot. As Holyfield observes, this issue is about more than the adult welfare participants. It is also about their children. Parents’ educational attainment directly affects their children’s lives. If parents can better their economic standing, their children are more likely to do better in school, as well as in a host of other areas. It ought to be encouraged, not merely allowed, that welfare participants’ college attendance counts as work. Unfortunately, one central conclusion to be gleaned from reading the Katz and Holyfield books together is that the neo-conservative turn in US social welfare policy has and will likely continue to constrain the educational opportunities of those in poverty.

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NOTES

1. I should note that in Britain, social welfare or social policy are sometimes known as social administration.
2. R. W. Connell (1993) provides a useful distinction between different types of poverty in a global context. While acknowledging the links and connections between them, he distinguishes between ‘poverty 1’, which is the most widespread and affects people in developing nations; ‘poverty 2’, which is the poverty situation of people in urban areas with low wages in nations with large, predominantly poor urban centres; and ‘poverty 3’, which occurs in high wage economies in industrialised Western nations, such as Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States (p. 20). When I use the term poverty herein, I am referring to what Connell calls ‘poverty 3’.
3. It is officially known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Public Law 104-193. In February 2003, the US House of Representatives passed a reauthorised welfare bill, HR 4, now entitled the Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act, which at the time of going to press is awaiting passage by the Senate as well.
4. Notable exceptions include Senators Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) and John Breaux (D-Louisiana) who oppose the increased work requirements in HR 4 and call for higher education to be counted as a work activity on the model of Maine’s Parents as Scholars programme.
5. There is indeed overwhelming evidence that higher education is valuable not only because of the economic advantages it brings individuals, but because it fosters a wide range of private individual and public social benefits. I cannot cite all of the benefits here, but see the Institute for Higher Education Policy’s comprehensive 1998 report, Reaping the Benefits: Defining the Public and Private Value of Going to College.
REFERENCES