



# WHY SCHOOL REPORT CARDS MERIT A FAILING GRADE

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## Executive Summary

Sixteen states have adopted school report card accountability systems that assign A-F letter grades to schools. Other states are now engaged in deliberation about whether they, too, should adopt such systems.

This brief examines A-F accountability systems with respect to three kinds of validity. First, we examine whether or not they are *valid as a measure*. That is, do these systems validly measure school quality? Second, we examine whether or not they are *valid as a policy instrument*. That is, how far do A-F accountability systems fulfill the stated aims of their proponents—empowering parents, providing “simple” and “common sense” measures of educational quality, and so on? Third, we examine whether or not A-F systems are *valid as a democratic framework*. That is, how well do these systems align with the broader goals of educating students for democratic citizenship and of incorporating parents and community members in democratic deliberation about policies for their public schools? We find that A-F accountability systems are invalid along each of these lines.

*The Validity of School Reports Cards as Measure of School Quality.* Despite the proliferation of A-F grading systems, there has been little credible research on whether letter grades validly measure and express school quality. We identify substantial problems with letter grades as a measure of school quality. Expressing school quality via a single composite grade is flawed. It is by no means clear what a single grade can mean across a diverse array of criteria that include achievement, attendance rates, dropout rates, and advanced class offerings. Little attention is devoted to justifying how these diverse criteria are combined to create a single letter grade. Further, expressing school quality on a crude five-point, A-F categorical scale produces considerable imprecision. Schools with the same grade are represented as equivalent when they can differ substantially. Within the five categories, differences are rendered invisible, and there is no way of knowing if the difference, for example, between an “F” and a “D” is of the same magnitude as the difference between a “D” and a “C.”

*The Validity of School Report Cards as a Policy Instrument.* There are strong reasons to doubt that A-F school grades fulfill the stated aims articulated by their proponents. Proponents argue that letter grades provide clear and simple information about school performance. But while a grade is superficially clear and simple, it is not necessarily “about school performance,” in the sense that the superficial understanding can reflect patently invalid representations of school quality. Proponents argue further that letter

grades empower parents and citizens to participate in decisions about schooling. But we find that these grades are more likely to alienate parents from democratic participation in the education of their children than to promote healthy school involvement. Finally, proponents argue that letter grades drive school improvement. But the grading systems neglect the central causes of aggregate school performance, such as community, family and school resources. This renders the grading systems ill-suited to drive school improvement.

*The Validity of School Report Cards as a Democratic Assessment Framework.* Schools have a central place in preparing democratic citizens who are able to engage in collaborative democratic deliberation. These citizens, in turn, play a fundamental role in deciding how future schools and society ought to be constructed. Yet no state A-F system measures directly the educational outcomes required to foster an effective democratic citizenry: civic engagement, the ability to engage with diverse others in democratic deliberation, or weighing evidence carefully and revising our beliefs when warranted. Except tangentially, these grades cannot tell us whether schools succeed in preparing students to be good democratic citizens. Schools that are granted “A” letter grades in existing accountability systems could fail to meet these democratic educational ends, while schools given “F” letter grades might well meet them. Broadly, A-F letter grades do little to promote democratic educational outcomes and indeed risk crowding these outcomes out of schooling. Thus they are invalid *as a democratic framework*.

## Recommendations

We endorse three recommendations offered recently by other researchers who examined the validity of one state’s school report card systems:<sup>1</sup>

- Eliminating “the single grade, which cannot be composed without adding together unlike elements and promoting confusion and misunderstanding.”
- Developing “a report card format that uses multiple school indicators that more adequately reflect a school performance profile.”
- Enlisting the services of assessment and evaluation experts in designing school accountability systems.

We find these recommendations sound, but we suggest supplementing them with two recommendations that take into consideration the need to consider the role and responsibilities of an educational system within a democratic society. Accordingly, in determining accountability systems for schools, policymakers should:

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1 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation. (January 2013). An examination of the Oklahoma state department of education’s report card. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERÉ;

The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation. (October 2013). *Oklahoma school grades: Hiding “poor” achievement*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERÉ.

- Enable democratic deliberation over the many possible purposes of schooling in a democratic society before determining assessment criteria. This would facilitate the use of indicators of “school quality” that reflect authentic conversation and the voices and experiences of all members of our democratic society.
- Ensure that accountability systems promote, rather than neglect or inhibit, the formation of democratic character—which must be consciously cultivated. While democratic outcomes may not be the only legitimate goal for public schools, they surely should be counted among the most essential.

# WHY SCHOOL REPORT CARDS MERIT A FAILING GRADE

## Introduction

Sixteen states have adopted accountability systems that assign A-F grades to schools.<sup>1</sup> Other states are now engaged in deliberation, often contentious,<sup>2</sup> about whether they, too, should adopt such systems, and how such systems should be conceived and implemented. Measures used to determine A-F grades for schools vary by state but often include graduation rates, ACT/SAT participation and scores, standardized student achievement test scores, growth in academic test scores, and attendance rates.

A-F grades have associated rewards and punishments, which vary by state. In Florida, for example, the Opportunity Scholarship Program allows students who have attended schools earning either one “F” or three consecutive years of “D” grades to exit and enroll in higher-performing public schools within their district or any other district in the state, provided space is available.<sup>3</sup> The A-F accountability system in Indiana requires the State Board of Education to intervene with a menu of options in schools that have received an “F” grade for six consecutive years. Options include merging the school with a nearby higher-performing school, assigning a “special management team” to operate all or some part of the school, closing the school, and revising the school’s improvement plan, among others.<sup>4</sup> Such state sanctions are examples of *direct* or *bureaucratic* accountability—systems where state officials determine rewards and punishments.

Typically, however, A-F school grading systems also incorporate *market* accountability—systems that allow parents and students to make choices about leaving one particular school for another, taking funding with them. Vehicles for market accountability are often choice and voucher programs. For example, the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program provides eligible students with state funding for partial or full tuition costs at participating choice schools, including religiously affiliated schools.<sup>5</sup> Such programs make schools *indirectly* accountable; when information about their performance is disseminated in A-F grades, families decide whether or not students will remain in a school. Proponents of choice systems maintain that allowing parents to remove their children from schools receiving low grades will ultimately ensure that only high-performing schools survive.

A-F school grading systems have considerable intuitive appeal to policymakers and parents as a good way to convey the quality of schools, to foster parental participation, and to spur school improvement. There is reason to become skeptical of the validity of A-F school grading systems, however, when one considers rationales and features more carefully, as we do in this brief. Below we look closely, first, at the rationales states have offered for implementing A-F report card systems; then, we examine such systems with respect to three kinds of validity. The first is whether they are *valid as a measure*. That is, do these

systems validly measure school quality? Second, we examine whether or not A-F systems are *valid as a policy instrument*. That is, how far do A-F accountability systems fulfill the stated aims—empowering parents, providing “simple” and “common sense” measures of educational quality, and so on—of their proponents? And third, we examine whether or not A-F systems are *valid as a democratic framework*. That is, how well do these systems align with the broader goals of educating students for democratic citizenship and of incorporating parent and community members in democratic deliberation about policies for their public schools?

## Rationales: What Claims are Made for A-F Systems?

Implemented over the last fifteen years or so, the A-F grading systems are a somewhat recent variation within the accountability movement in public education.<sup>6</sup> Florida was the first to adopt an A-F system. Jeb Bush, then governor of Florida, worked with the state legislature to craft and implement his “A+ Education Plan” in 1999, which put school A-F grades at the center. Students who attended schools that received an “F” two out of four years were eligible to attend either a higher-performing public school or to receive a voucher that could be used to attend a participating private school.<sup>7</sup> While Florida policymakers have substantially revised the original A+ Plan, A-F grades remain central to Florida’s accountability system. Fifteen states have now followed Florida in constructing accountability measures around A-F school grades. An important impetus for states that have implemented or are considering implementing them is the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) waiver process. Generally speaking, states that incorporate into their policies accountability mechanisms such as A-F school grades and expanded choice are more likely to be successful in receiving approval to waive the original, rigid accountability requirements of the federal NCLB policy.

Rationales given for A-F systems are strikingly similar across states, as if they reverberate in an echo chamber. Florida is frequently cited as an obvious success of A-F systems, and other states frequently cite similar—or indeed, identical—rationales when they choose the A-F path. For example, Jeb Bush’s Foundation for Florida’s Future argues:

Assigning a letter grade (A-F) is a way to report a school’s effectiveness in a manner everyone can understand. Used along with rewards for improving schools and support for schools that need to improve, grading schools encourages them to make student achievement their primary focus.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, the Arizona Department of Education writes that “the A-F Letter Grade System was created to provide clear, easy to understand information to parents so that they could base their educational decisions on the best information available about the overall academic performance of schools and districts/charter holders.”<sup>9</sup> And in Utah, A-F proponents contend that:

With this important accountability system in place, Utah is empowering everyone—whether school administrators, parents, classroom teachers or

citizens—to make informed choices and to identify ways to strengthen and improve all of our schools for the benefit of every student in Utah.<sup>10</sup>

School report cards, proponents suggest, “give schools a tool to encourage more parental and community involvement.”<sup>11</sup> Such involvement is assumed to be important because “schools with higher levels of parent and community involvement have a better chance of succeeding.”<sup>12</sup>

Making an explicit link to the Florida system, Utah’s school grading website prominently features a quote from Jeb Bush—“what gets measured gets done”—and provides other rationales that reference Florida.<sup>13</sup> The Indiana Department of Education suggests that “giving schools letter grades for their performance—just as we do for our students—ensures parents, students, educators and communities understand how their schools are performing.”<sup>14</sup> They write further that “Indiana’s A through F grading system gives parents, students, educators and communities a clear and concise assessment of how well their schools are doing.” The West Virginia Department of Education echoes Indiana with: “giving schools letter grades for their performance—just as we do for our students—ensures parents, students, educators and communities understand how their schools are performing.”<sup>15</sup> And further: “West Virginia’s A-F school grading system gives parents, students, educators and communities clear and concise information on how well their schools are doing.”

*To be meaningful, the letter grade would need to represent a school’s performance pattern, but it turns out that within-school variation across subject areas fluctuates a great deal.*

Private organizations such as Michelle Rhee’s Students First, Jeb Bush’s Foundation for Excellence in Education, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) have added significant voices to the echo chamber, advocating for the creation of more such A-F accountability systems. Students First, perhaps the most visible and active advocate among these private organizations, now assigns A-F grades and GPA scores to states based on the extent to which they “empower parents,” “elevate the teaching profession,” and “spend wisely and govern well,” which the organization takes to require, among other policies, assigning A-F grades to all K-12 schools.<sup>16</sup> Students First writes: “Students First believes an A-F letter-grading system that grades each K-12 school based on how well they serve their students is a powerful tool for informing parent decision-making.”<sup>17</sup> ALEC has also endorsed A-F letter grades. Describing the adoption of letter grades in North Carolina, ALEC contends that A-F grades are “a crucial step toward increasing transparency in the system”; such grades, one ALEC report argues, describe school performance “on a universally understood scale.”<sup>18</sup>

It appears, then, that the chorus in favor of A-F systems seems to be singing the same refrain: A-F systems are said to be clear, concise systems that let everyone know how schools are doing and encourage parents to be involved in school choices and systems. Embedded in these claims, however, are several assumptions that need to be closely

examined. These include the assumption that these systems accurately and adequately measure what they purport to measure (school quality) and that they actually advance goals they purport to advance (parental empowerment, democratic engagement and citizenship, and so on). They also include the assumption that fostering the democratic aims of education need not be among the considerations that go into designing accountability systems and assessing their validity. The following segments provide a close examination of these assumptions, finding them questionable at best.

## **The Validity of School Report Cards as a Measure of School Quality**

Do state A-F school grades serve as valid indicators of school quality? Space limitations do not permit a description of each of the 16 state systems (see the Appendix for detail on individual state systems). To be sure, there are differences among state plans. Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, and Virginia, for example, appear to be the only states that move beyond a narrow focus on reading and mathematics and include social studies proficiency in their A-F grades.

Despite their proliferation and variation, there has been little or no credible research on these state systems. What is known comes primarily from two recent reports produced by university researchers at The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Education Research and Evaluation.<sup>19</sup> These reports raise substantial doubts about the validity of the Oklahoma A-F system as a measure. To our knowledge, these reports supply the only careful and relatively rigorous examinations of the validity of A-F school grading systems as a measure of school quality to date, and so we rely heavily on them in this analysis.

We found that all state A-F school grading systems share four pivotal features with Oklahoma's: (1) school quality is summarized in a single composite letter grade<sup>20</sup> on (2) a five-point categorical scale (3) using proficiency levels to measure academic achievement. And (4): A-F school report cards are composite scores of unmediated outcomes. This fourth feature implicitly assumes that the school itself is primarily, if not exclusively, responsible for student performance. Because the four features are, indeed, shared across all state A-F systems, the findings from Oklahoma provide a source of criticisms that generalize relatively straightforwardly across other state systems. Questions about and criticisms of each component follow.

### **1. A single composite grade**

A single composite score as an index of school qualities is a dubious proposition. It is by no means clear what a single grade can mean across such a diverse array of criteria—achievement, attendance rates, dropout rates, advanced class offerings, and so on (see the Appendix for an illustration of the range of possible criteria). Little, if any, attention is paid to how to justify combining the diverse components of each grade to render a value on

the A-F scale. For example, in addition to whether or not to include attendance as a criterion, policymakers have to decide how heavily to weight it if they do: 10%? 20%? Should improvement in achievement levels be calculated, or should only raw achievement scores be included? The selection and weighting of criteria seem to have no basis other than the seat-of-the pants intuitions of policymakers woefully lacking in technical knowledge and skills.

## 2. Five-point scale

A-F grades exemplify a crude categorical scale. This produces considerable imprecision. Schools with the same grade are represented as equivalent when they can differ substantially. Within the five categories differences are rendered invisible, and there is no way of knowing if the difference between an “F” and a “D” is of the same magnitude as the difference between a “D” and an “C,” or if the difference between a “C” and “B” is of the same magnitude as the difference between a “B” and an “A.” But the problem goes deeper than simply imprecise scaling. Successfully remedying the problem of the imprecision of the A-F scale assumes that the grades are potentially intelligible, if imprecise, indicators of school quality, which is by no means evident. The numerical intervals of computed composite scores that are translated into the various grades, like the weighing of the various criteria that go into the computations, have no firmer basis than unprofessional intuition. The fundamental problem here, that a more precise scale cannot remedy, is the assumption, discussed in (1), that a single composite score for school quality is meaningful.

## 3. Proficiency level as measures of academic achievement

The Oklahoma findings reveal serious problems of imprecision and lack of interpretability associated with the use of proficiency levels to represent the academic achievement component of school grades. Thirty-three percent of Oklahoma school grades are based on student achievement values. However, the numerical test scores are grouped into only four proficiency levels: unsatisfactory, limited knowledge, proficient, and advanced. It is these calculated proficiency levels that are used in the grading formula—and also in calculations of academic growth, weighted at 34% in the grading formula. The procedure of converting original test score data to proficiency levels and using the new proficiency data to produce values for achievement and growth introduces unnecessary imprecision because it “amounts to throwing away information about examinee test performance”<sup>21</sup> and thereby masks otherwise detectable differences in student academic performance within proficiency levels.<sup>22</sup>

Such conflating of data muddies its interpretation. Empirical analysis of Oklahoma school grades revealed, for example, that there were practically no differences in average science and reading scores among “A,” “B,” and “C” schools. Students in “C” schools had higher average science scores than students in “B” schools. And students in “F” schools appeared to have had higher average reading and math achievement than students in “D” schools. Further, certain schools with lower letter grades performed better in mathematics than

schools with higher letter grades.<sup>23</sup> Here it may be asked: “If a letter grade, which is based primarily on standardized test scores,<sup>24</sup> does not necessarily tell us anything about school differences in reading, math, and science outcomes, what does it tell us?”<sup>25</sup> The answer here seems to be that it tells us very little or nothing. To be meaningful, the letter grade would need to represent a school’s performance pattern, but it turns out that within-school variation across subject areas fluctuates a great deal. Thus, it is never clear what an “A” is or what an “F” indicates.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4. A-F school report cards as composite scores of unmediated outcomes

The findings of the celebrated Coleman Report,<sup>27</sup> produced 50 years ago, have proved to be impressively robust: schools account for a remarkably small amount of the variance in student achievement scores (perceived as remarkably small in the mid-1960s).<sup>28</sup> Credible empirical research continues to show that school effects typically account for less than 30% of student academic performance.<sup>29</sup> Using only student academic performance and other isolated outcome measures to assign A-F school grades is, then, confusing—or even deceptive—because it ignores and obscures many important factors that contribute to school performance. Letter grades ignore, for example, the well-documented correlation between socioeconomic status and attendance and graduation rates,<sup>30</sup> and they attribute academic proficiency changes directly to schools that students attended only most recently.<sup>31</sup> The “primary assumption of the A-F accountability system, that student test scores can be dissected and manipulated into valid indicators of school performance, is simply false.”<sup>32</sup>

Despite such weaknesses, A-F school report cards are one among many school accountability systems spawned by No Child Left Behind’s mania for assessment. State after state claims that school grades are intuitive and easy for parents and the public to understand, since they are analogous with subject matter grades, with which virtually everyone is familiar. School grades are thus touted as providing valuable information to parents in their decision-making about schools, facilitating increased and more effective participation on their part, and ultimately fostering school improvement.

These are largely claims about the validity of A-F school grading as a policy instrument, the topic of the next section. However, we make the preliminary observation here that it is unlikely that such grading systems can accomplish purported policy objectives if they fail on the prerequisite of validity—if they do not in fact accurately measure school quality. And they do in fact fail: as we show above, they do not and cannot provide an accurate assessment of school quality. Although there is some evidence that parents do, indeed, find school report cards useful in evaluating schools, especially when presented with appealing graphics,<sup>33</sup> this is a case in which the perceived “face validity” of school report cards—the intuitive perception of validity—surely goes awry. “If [an A-F grading system] seems easy to understand, it is only because the use of a single indicator to represent something complex is familiar. We are used to letter grades. A truly comprehensive evaluation system is best not boiled down to a single value because it masks the very complexity it is trying to capture.”<sup>34</sup> The formulas by which school report cards are computed are often not readily

available, and are inscrutably byzantine in any case. It would require a very atypical parent, indeed, to understand what the grades mean, particularly when it is by no means clear that they have any coherent meaning at all.

One final observation about the validity of A-F school grades as a measure of school quality: no state A-F system includes among its criteria democratic citizenship, the ability to engage in democratic dialogue with diverse others, and other public and civic educational outcomes.<sup>35</sup> How far can a letter grade that makes no mention of democratic citizenship validly measure school quality in a democratic society?

In sum, there are very strong reasons to reject the validity of A-F school grading systems, as currently conceived and implemented, as a measure of school quality. But the problems that beset A-F school grading systems apply not just to current systems. There are no technical fixes: the single summary evaluation on a crude five-point scale is irremediably flawed.

## The Validity of School Report Cards as a Policy Instrument

The question of *validity as a policy instrument* of A-F grading systems is the question of how far such systems succeed in fulfilling proponents' stated aims. Above, we detailed evidence of an "echo chamber," where rationales for A-F school grading systems were similar, or indeed identical, across the states.

We identified three rationales commonly articulated by proponents: (1) A-F school grades provide "simple" and "common sense" information to parents and communities about the education of their children.<sup>36</sup> (2) By providing such information, A-F school grades encourage and empower citizens, parents, teachers, and administrators to participate in and take rational control of decisions about schooling.<sup>37</sup> (3) A-F school grading systems work to improve schools to everyone's benefit—as enabled and fostered by the realization of rationales (1) and (2).<sup>38</sup> We argue that there are good reasons to doubt each of these rationales

Rationale 1—*letter grades provide parents and communities with clear information about school performance*—is thoroughly undermined by the analysis of the previous section. However simple and common sense school report cards may appear to the untrained eye, a modicum of technical analysis reveals them to be patently invalid representations of school quality. As previously observed, it follows that because school report cards are invalid as a representation of school quality, so must be policy instruments based upon them. The invalidity of school report cards as a representation of school quality leaves rationale one adrift, anchored in nothing.

Like Rationale 1, Rationale 2—*A-F school grades encourage and empower citizens, parents, teachers, and administrators to participate in and take rational control over decisions about schooling*—finds its warrant in no more than common sense, apparently, for supporters cite no empirical research in its defense. And, we found no empirical research that speaks directly to the issue. We did find, however, a single recent study on

the general relationship between state accountability systems and parents' attitudes toward government, their political participation, and their involvement in the education of their children. When the study's findings are extrapolated to school report card systems, they undermine the claim that A-F grading empowers stakeholders.<sup>39</sup>

Specifically, the study found that “parents residing in states with more developed assessment systems express significantly lower trust in government, substantially decreased confidence in government efficacy, and much more negative attitudes about their children's schools.”<sup>40</sup> Accountability policies “demobilize parents by excluding them from key educational decisions and enmeshing their children's schools in a punitive testing context that elicits parental anxiety and dissatisfaction.”<sup>41</sup> Significantly, parents in these states were less likely to participate substantively in the education of their children. When parents are alienated from democratic deliberation about public schooling, as they are in an A-F environment, they come to hold negative attitudes about schools in particular and government generally; in this way, they are actually separated from substantial democratic involvement with schools. Thus, rather than enhancing parental participation, more highly developed accountability systems, such as those exemplified by A-F school grading systems, actually suppressed it.<sup>42</sup>

Rationale 3—*A-F school grading systems work to improve schools to everyone's benefit* (as enabled and fostered by the realization of rationales 1 and 2)—fails along with the others because of the cumulative relationship it bears to them. There are still further problems with this claim. As observed previously, the factors incorporated into A-F school report cards are confined to student academic performance and other outcome measures in isolation from the social, cultural, and economic context and from the policies, practices, and level of resources of schools. This is the source of two significant problems.

First, confining evaluation criteria to student academic performance and other outcome measures in isolation from the social, cultural, and economic context and from policies, practices, and resources of schools is unfair to teachers, administrators, students and others: it holds them fully accountable for outcomes which they have limited power to produce. Two of the cardinal requirements for fairly implementing high-stakes testing are: 1) that all students are taught in conditions that provide a fair opportunity to learn test material, and 2) that the validity of reporting categories (proficiency levels, for example, or A-F grades) be established.<sup>43</sup> Neither of these requirements is met by school report card systems.

The issue of fairness to those being held accountable is particularly germane to bureaucratic accountability, where rewards and sanctions follow directly from the report card evaluations and are assumed to be drivers of improvement. The so-called *theory of action* underlying bureaucratic accountability may be questioned. Citing a recent white paper authored by an impressive group of educational testing policy scholars,<sup>44</sup> the Oklahoma researchers contend “it is a myth to think that using student test scores to punish or reward schools is a driver of improvement.”<sup>45</sup> In the view of these researchers, failure to improve academic outcomes emerges not from individual actors' failings, but rather from lack of necessary resources. Given that A-F letter grades and consequent

interventions in Oklahoma do not meaningfully address profound differences in capacity and school resources, there is little reason to believe that they will strengthen schools.

The second significant problem with confining evaluation criteria to student academic performance and other outcome measures in isolation is that it precludes the capacity to produce the formative knowledge needed to improve performance on desired outcomes. In collapsing information from a limited number of outcome measures, grading plans divert attention from how school policies, practices, and resources interact with out-of-school factors and the characteristics of diverse students to produce (or fail to produce) desired educational outcomes. The focus on isolated outcomes, combined with the crude summary evaluations that grades on an A-F scale provide, undermines the claim that A-F grading systems function in general to improve schools. In fact, they are particularly ill-suited to address group-based gaps in achievement. In Oklahoma, for example, A-F letter grades tended to obscure, rather than reveal, within-school achievement gaps. Schools marked “A” and “B” were found to be least effective for minority students and students receiving free or reduced-price lunch (FRL).<sup>46</sup> Further, FRL students attending “D” and “F” schools had better average math, reading, and science scores than FRL students in “A” and “B” schools. The measure of school quality embedded in the Oklahoma A-F system is blind to achievement gaps. Rather than making them visible and thus allowing communities and policymakers to address them, letter grades in this case have rendered them invisible, subsuming them into differences between schools.

Almost all state plans include achievement growth as a general criterion in addition to achievement growth in the lowest quartile as a distinct criterion. Growth measures serve as a way of controlling for the influence of different student characteristics by measuring the difference between student achievement at the beginning and the end of a given period of time, on the presumption that what happens in schools causes whatever difference exist. But this is hardly sufficient to overcome the problems associated with an exclusive focus on school outcomes: It neglects the role of social, cultural, and economic factors outside of schools, as well as of the policies, practices and resources of schools—all of which play a significant role in producing those outcomes.

In summary, there are strong reasons to doubt that A-F school grades fulfill the aims articulated by their proponents and are valid *as a policy instrument*. Their neglect of contextual features, and of the policies, practices, and resources of schools, renders them ill-suited to drive school improvement. Rather than working to empower parents and community members in a way that promotes school involvement, they are more likely to alienate parents from democratic participation in the education of their children.

## The Validity of School Report Cards as a Democratic Assessment Framework

Even if A-F school grades proved *valid as measure of quality* and *valid as policy instrument*—which they do not—there are still strong reasons to hold that they are invalid *as a democratic assessment framework*. A-F systems appear to ignore entirely, for

example, the fundamental place of schooling in preparing democratic citizens who are able to engage in collaborative democratic deliberation in order to determine how schools and society ought to be constructed.

Questions about the validity of school report cards as measure of school quality and as a policy instrument, cannot be—*should not be*—abstracted from the broader normative discussion about the place of education within a robust democracy. Typically, however, there is little or no public deliberation about which specific outcomes need to be incorporated into assessment systems. For example, while such outcomes as job preparation are commonly promoted, there is little discourse about why such preparation is essential, how it is best defined, or how the need for such a practical outcome might be balanced with others—like preparation for participation in active citizenship. Criteria reflect particular political commitments, and they are currently being imposed with little or no consideration of competing educational and social visions.

In contrast, in a democratic society the question of how schools ought to be structured should be subject to continual democratic deliberation. Implementation of particular visions should be open to continual revision as new reasons and contexts evolve. Proponents of the A-F systems claim they produce democratic engagement as a matter of course, as when, for example, Indiana policymakers state: “The greatest benefit of the A through F school grading system is heightened community awareness and increased dialogue and action among education stakeholders.”<sup>47</sup> And yet, existing evidence suggests that A-F systems conversely tend to stifle democratic control over educational structures.

In addition, no state A-F system measures directly the educational outcomes required to foster an effective democratic citizenry: civic engagement; the ability to engage with diverse others in authentic deliberation; understanding beliefs to be revisable and indeed revising them in light of contradictory evidence; working to maintain the conditions of democratic society, and so on. The general educational vision contained in A-F systems neglects—or perhaps even undermines—the desirability of schools to cultivate in students the prerequisite for democratic deliberation: *democratic character*, which includes the knowledge, abilities, and dispositions needed for effective participation in democratic politics. Michele Moses and John Rogers argue that democratic citizens must develop both *capacities for* and *commitments to* democratic deliberation, such as listening, weighing evidence, communicating with people from diverse backgrounds, and thinking critically about, rather than merely accordance with, authority.<sup>48</sup> Except tangentially, no difference between “A” and “F” schools can tell us whether or not schools succeed in preparing students to be good democratic citizens. Schools that are granted “A” letter grades in existing accountability systems could be meeting these democratic educational ends considerably less well than schools receiving lower grades.

A-F school grading systems appear consistent with, if not outright supportive of, a narrowly vocationalist vision of schooling. Such systems commonly conflate *education* and *education for economic ends*. Consider, for example, the rationales given for A-F school grades in a Fall 2013 presentation produced by the Louisiana Department of Education (DoE).<sup>49</sup> The Louisiana DoE advances two arguments in support of letter grades. First, it

contends that “American education outcomes are not competitive internationally.” Reports that many other countries have outperformed the U.S. educationally, the department suggests, have substantive economic consequences: “there is substantial cost to our country and our state associated with lower educational outcomes. Had the U.S. closed the international achievement gap by 1998, the GDP could have been \$1.3 trillion to \$2.3 trillion higher in 2008.” Second, the department notes that “Louisiana graduates will struggle to compete for jobs” because of inadequate school outcomes. Most new jobs, they write, will require education after high school. A-F school grades are taken to be a part of the solution to both of these (economic) problems. We find no discussion here of non-market educational outcomes—cultivating, for example, good democratic citizens or ensuring that students have studied and worked with diverse others.

Post-NCLB accountability systems, which include A-F school grades, have driven a narrowing of the curriculum away from democratic educational outcomes, especially away from the curricular content necessary for cultivating the democratic character.<sup>50</sup> The intense focus on content knowledge, particularly English and mathematics, created by accountability systems has significantly limited attention to other subjects and goals, including democratic outcomes.<sup>51</sup> There is little reason to believe that A-F systems will, without substantial revision, promote democratic education. Certainly they are not aimed directly at cultivating “critical habits of the mind and the inclination to deliberate and debate conscientiously on matters of social importance” which are central to democratic character.<sup>52</sup> A-F systems are thus invalid *as a democratic framework*: they do little to promote democratic educational ends and indeed risk crowding these ends out of schooling.

*The measure of school quality embedded in the Oklahoma A-F system is blind to achievement gaps.*

Much hangs on whether or not all students, especially those who belong to historically marginalized groups, are given the tools necessary for participating in democratic politics. In democratic society, these students should be provided the abilities and knowledge for protesting the unjust circumstances into which they have been thrown, for giving voice to their

experiences and making those voices forceful in democratic politics. Otherwise, their experiences and voices are denied, subsumed into dominant and narrow representations of how schools and society ought to be organized. And, they are too often forced to comply with these dominant representations even as these representations diminish their own experiences and force them into alienating social and economic positions. Any accountability system that fails to recognize the responsibility to cultivate the democratic character might well be said to help maintain existing injustice along lines of social class, gender, race, sexual orientation, and so on. To deny these historically marginalized groups the very tools necessary for participating in democratic politics is to collaborate in the process of consciously reproducing the highly unequal status quo. In this way, A-F systems are complicit in maintaining the existing social order and, consequently, the power and status of those who benefit from contemporary power arrangements.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

We endorse three recommendations of the Oklahoma researchers, who suggest to policymakers:

- Eliminating “the single grade, which cannot be composed without adding together unlike elements and promoting confusion and misunderstanding.”<sup>53</sup>
- Developing “a report card format that uses multiple school indicators that more adequately reflect a school performance profile.”<sup>54</sup>
- Enlisting the services of assessment and evaluation experts in designing school accountability systems.

While we find these recommendations sound, we believe that alone they are too narrow, that they fail to take into consideration the need to consider the role and responsibilities of an educational system within a democratic society. Therefore, we add our own recommendations to those above, noting we believe these are relevant not only to A-F grading systems but to all school accountability systems.

Given the above discussion, we recommend that in determining accountability systems for schools, policymakers:

- Enable democratic deliberation over the many possible purposes of schooling in a democratic society before determining assessment criteria. The indicators of “school quality” must be determined through authentic conversation, reflecting the voices and experiences of all members of our democratic society—not just the narrow vision of policymakers.
- Ensure that accountability systems promote, rather than neglect or inhibit, the formation of democratic character—which must be consciously cultivated. While democratic outcomes may not be the only legitimate goal for public schools, they surely should be counted among the most essential.

## Appendix

**Table 1. State A-F Accountability Systems**

Information gathered from individual state Department of Education websites and from the Education Commission of the States table located at <http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/MBquest3RT?Rep=ar10>.

| State           | Measured   | Student Achievement Scale  | Formula/Weighting  |
|-----------------|--|--|--|
| <i>Alabama</i>  | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Annual Measurable Objective AMO or AYP<br>End-of-Course Exams<br>ACT/SAT Scores<br>Advanced Placement Scores<br>International Baccalaureate Participation Rate<br>College and Career Readiness Workkeys Scores<br>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment<br>Graduation Rate<br>Academic Trend Data<br>National Industry Certifications<br>Other<br>Teacher/Administrator Performance | Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—achievement calculated based upon the percent of proficient (or above) students | Elementary and Middle Schools—90 points possible:<br>40 points—Achievement (Reading and Mathematics)<br>30 points—Closing Reading and Mathematics Achievement Gap<br>20 points—Attendance Rates<br>High Schools—90 points possible:<br>25 points—Achievement (English and Mathematics)<br>25 points—Closing Graduation Gap<br>40 points—Graduation Rate  |
| <i>Arkansas</i> | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Annual Measurable Objective<br>Graduation Rate  | Proficiency Scale (4 Level)—below basic, basic, proficient, advanced   | Weighted Performance Score—schools earn partial credit for students scoring “basic,” full credit for students scoring “proficient,” and bonus credit for students scoring “advanced” in Literacy and Math<br>Improvement Score—schools earn points for meeting annual targets for school improvement<br>Four-Year Cohort Graduation Rate—schools with at least 25 expected graduates earn points for their graduation rate |

| State          | Measured  | Student Achievement Scale  | Formula/Weighting  |
|----------------|---|--|--|
| <i>Arizona</i> | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>ELL Achievement Gains<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>Dropout Rate<br>Graduation Rate  | Proficiency Scale (4 Level)—falls far below standards, approaches standards, meets standards, exceeds standards  | Elementary and Middle Schools:<br>50% Growth Score (25% growth of all students + 25% growth of students in lowest performing quartile)<br>50% Composite Score (percent passing AIMS tests, percent ELL students reclassified, Falls Far Below reduction)<br>High Schools:<br>50% Growth Score (25% growth of all students + 25% growth of students in lowest performing quartile)<br>50% Composite Score (percent passing AIMS tests, percent ELL students reclassified, graduation rate, dropout rate)  |
| <i>Florida</i> | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Academic Growth of Lowest Quartile<br>End-of-Course Exams<br>Advanced Placement Scores<br>International Baccalaureate Participation Rate<br>College and Career Readiness<br>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment<br>Attendance Rates<br>Graduate Rate<br>Percentage of Student Retention<br>National Industry Certifications<br>High School Readiness<br>Growth of Highest Achievers<br>Other | Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—schools earn one point for each percent of students who score satisfactory or higher on state assessments in the subject area | Elementary and Middle Schools:<br>100% based on combination of student achievement scores, end-of-course assessments, student learning gains in reading and mathematics, and improvement of lowest quartile of students in reading and mathematics.<br>High Schools:<br>50% based on combination of student achievement scores, end-of-course assessments, student learning gains in reading and mathematics, and improvement of lowest quartile of students in reading and mathematics. 50% based on graduation rate, student participation and performance in Advanced Placement, International Baccalaureate, and Advanced International Certification of Education Courses, student achievement national industry certification, postsecondary readiness as measured by SAT/ACT scores, graduation of at risk students, and growth or decline of above components. |

| State            | Measured   | Student Achievement Scale   | Formula/Weighting  |
|------------------|--|---|--|
| <i>Indiana</i>   | <p>Assessment Scores/Student Achievement</p> <p>Achievement Gap Closure</p> <p>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile</p> <p>End-of-Course Exams</p> <p>ACT/SAT Scores</p> <p>Advanced Placement Scores</p> <p>International Baccalaureate Participation Rate</p> <p>College and Career Readiness</p> <p>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment</p> <p>Graduation Rate</p> <p>National Industry Certifications</p> <p>Growth of Highest Achievers</p> <p>Profile Information: Student Demographic &amp; Socioeconomic Data</p> | <p>Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—scores assigned based on percentage of students passing state tests</p> | <p>Elementary and Middle Schools: Preliminary score generated by English and Math scores based on percentage of students who passed standardized ISTEP+, IMAST, and ISTAR test. Preliminary score may be raised or lowered based on student academic growth and participation in standardized tests.</p> <p>High Schools:</p> <p>English Proficiency—30%</p> <p>Mathematics Proficiency—30%</p> <p>Graduation Rate—30%</p> <p>College and Career Readiness—10%</p>   |
| <i>Louisiana</i> | <p>Assessment Scores/Student Achievement</p> <p>Achievement Gap Closure</p> <p>Growth/Academic Progress</p> <p>Annual Measureable Objective AMO or AYP</p> <p>End-of-Course Exams</p> <p>ACT/SAT Scores</p> <p>Advanced Placement Scores</p> <p>International Baccalaureate Participation</p> <p>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment</p> <p>Dropout Rate</p> <p>Graduation Rate</p> <p>Student Credits Earned</p> <p>9<sup>th</sup> Grade Students on Track to Graduate</p>   | <p>Proficiency Scale (3 Level)—below grade level, at grade level, above grade level</p>                                     | <p>Elementary Schools: 100% of letter grade is based on student achievement on annual assessments in language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies.</p> <p>Middle Schools: 95% of letter grade is based on student achievement on annual assessments with 5% based on credits earned through the end of students' 9<sup>th</sup> grade.</p> <p>High Schools:</p> <p>50% of letter grade is based on student academic achievement (25% ACT, 25% end-of-course assessment).</p> <p>50% of the school grade is based on graduation (25% on graduation index, which rewards achievements like Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate exam credit and 25% on cohort graduation rate).</p> |
| <i>Maine</i>     | <p>Assessment Scores/Student Achievement</p> <p>Achievement Gap Closure</p> <p>Growth/Academic Progress</p> <p>Academic Progress of Lowest</p>   | <p>Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—scores assigned based on percentage of students earning</p>             | <p>Elementary and Middle Schools:</p> <p>Proficiency 50% of letter grade—mathematics and reading</p>   |

| State                       | Measured   | Student Achievement Scale  | Formula/Weighting   |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|
| <i>Maine</i><br>(continued) | Quartile Graduation Rate   | proficient and proficient with distinction achievement levels    | Growth 50% of letter grade—growth in mathematics and reading for all students, growth in mathematics and reading for bottom 25%<br>High Schools:<br>Proficiency 40% of letter grade—mathematics and reading<br>Progress 40% of letter grade—growth in mathematics and reading for all students<br>Graduation Rate 20%   |
| <i>Mississippi</i>          | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>Graduation Rate | Proficiency Scale (4 level)—minimal, basic, proficient, advanced | Elementary and Middle Schools—700 possible points:<br>1. Reading Proficiency (100 points)<br>2. Reading Growth—All Students (100 points)<br>3. Reading Growth—Low 25% of Students (100 points)<br>4. Math Proficiency (100 points)<br>5. Math Growth—All Students (100 points)<br>6. Math Growth—Low 25% of Students (100 points)<br>7. Science Proficiency (100 points)<br>High Schools—950 possible points:<br>1. Reading Proficiency (100 points)<br>2. Reading Growth—All Students (100 points)<br>3. Reading Growth—Low 25% of Students (100 points)<br>4. Math Proficiency (100 points)<br>5. Math Growth—All Students (100 points)<br>6. Math Growth—Low 25% of Students (100 points)<br>7. Science Proficiency (50 points)<br>8. U.S. History Proficiency (50 points)<br>9. Graduation Rate—All Students (200 points)<br>10. College & Career Readiness (50 points) |

| State                 | Measured  | Student Achievement Scale   | Formula/Weighting   |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|
| <i>New Mexico</i>     | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Annual Measureable Objective AMO or AYP<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>ACT/SAT Participation & Scores<br>Advanced Placement Participation & Scores<br>International Baccalaureate Participation<br>College and Career Readiness<br>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment<br>Attendance Rates<br>Graduation Rates<br>Student Surveys<br>Parental/Community Involvement<br>Academic Trend Data<br>School Climate<br>CTE<br>Certifications/Competencies<br>Growth of Highest Achievers<br>Profile Information: Student Demographic & Socioeconomic Data | Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—scores assigned based on percentage of students proficient or advanced on state tests    | Elementary/Middle Schools:<br>Current Standing (Proficiency)—40%<br>Growth (School and Student)—50%<br>Opportunity to Learn (Attendance and Student Survey)—10%<br>High Schools:<br>Current Standing (Proficiency)—30%<br>Growth (School and Student)—30%<br>Opportunity to Learn (Attendance and Student Survey)—8%<br>Graduation—17%<br>College and Career Readiness (e.g., SAT scores, AP participation, etc.)—15% |
| <i>North Carolina</i> | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Annual Measurable Objective AMO or AYP<br>End-of-Course Exams<br>ACT/SAT Participation & Scores<br>College and Career Readiness<br>NAEP Scores<br>Attendance Rates<br>Graduation Rate<br>Academic Trend Data<br>CTE<br>Certifications/Competencies  | Proficiency Scale (5 Level)—superior command of knowledge and skills, solid command, sufficient command, partial command, limited command | Not Found   |

| State           | Measured   | Student Achievement Scale  | Formula/Weighting   |
|-----------------|--|--|---|
| <b>Ohio</b>     | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Annual Measurable Objective AMO or AYP<br>ACT/SAT Participation & Scores<br>Advanced Placement Participation & Scores<br>College and Career Readiness<br>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment<br>Attendance Rates<br>Graduate Rate   | Proficiency Scale (6 Level)—advanced plus, advanced, accelerated, proficient, basic, limited | Letter grades assigned for several different categories. Composite grades to begin in 2016.<br>Letter grade categories:<br>1. Performance Index—measures combined state test results of all students<br>2. Indicators Met—measures the percentage of students who have passed state tests<br>3. Progress—measures student growth against one year’s worth of growth<br>4. Annual Measurable Objective—compares performance of student subgroups against state goals<br>5. Graduation Rates—percentage of students who graduated 4 or 5 years after entering<br>6. K-3 Literacy—measures K-3 reading and writing<br>7. Prepared for Success—measures student preparation for college and careers   |
| <b>Oklahoma</b> | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>End-of-Course Exams<br>ACT/SAT Participation & Scores<br>International Baccalaureate Participation<br>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment<br>% in Higher Level Coursework<br>Attendance Rate<br>Dropout Rate<br>Graduation Rate<br>High School Graduation of at-risk 8 <sup>th</sup> graders<br>Parental/Community Involvement<br>National Industry Certifications<br>High School Readiness<br>Other<br>School Climate | Proficiency Scale (4 Level)—unsatisfactory, limited knowledge, proficient, advanced          | 50% on whole school performance, as measured by allocating one point for each student who scores proficient or advanced on the criterion-referenced tests and end-of-instruction tests and alternative test scores divided by the number of students taking the tests.<br>25% on whole school growth, as measured by allocating one point for each student who improves proficiency levels or improves substantially within a proficiency level on criterion-referenced tests and end-of-instruction tests divided by the number of students taking the tests.<br>25% on growth in the bottom quartile of students, as measured by allocating one point for each student in the bottom quartile who improves proficiency levels or improves substantially within a proficiency level on criterion-referenced tests and end-of-instruction tests divided by the number of students taking the tests. |

| State  | Measured   | Student Achievement Scale   | Formula/Weighting  |
|--|--|---|--|
| <b>Texas</b>   | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>College and Career Readiness<br>% Enrolled in Postsecondary/Post HS Programs<br>Dropout Rate<br>Graduation Rate<br>Student Credits Earned<br>National Industry Certifications<br>Profile Information: Student Demographic & Socioeconomic Data<br>Enrollment | Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—scores assigned based on number of student tests that meet or exceed “satisfactory” standard | Index I. Student Achievement—25%<br>Index II. Student Progress—25%<br>Index III. Closing Performance Gaps—25%<br>Index IV. Postsecondary Readiness—25%   |
| <b>Utah</b>  | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>ACT/SAT Scores<br>College and Career Readiness<br>Graduation Rate  | Proficiency Scale (4 Level)—below proficient, approaching proficient, proficient, highly proficient   | Elementary and Middle Schools—600 points possible:<br>Growth of all students—200 points<br>Growth of below proficient students—100 points.<br>Achievement (percentage of students at or above proficiency)—300 points.<br>High Schools—600 points possible:<br>Growth of all students—200 points<br>Growth of below proficient students—100 points<br>Achievement (percentage of students at or above proficient)—150 points<br>Graduation rate—150 points |
| <b>Virginia</b><br>(Deadline for implementation delayed to 2016) | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Annual Measurable Objective AMO or AYP<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>College and Career Readiness<br>Dual/Concurrent Enrollment   | Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—scores assigned based on number of students that demonstrate proficiency on state tests      | Elementary and Middle Schools:<br>Proficiency (mathematics, English, science, history)—50%<br>Overall Student Growth in English and mathematics—25%<br>Lowest Performing Student Growth in English and mathematics—25%<br>High Schools:<br>Proficiency (mathematics, English,  |

| State   | Measured  | Student Achievement Scale   | Formula/Weighting  |
|---|---|---|--|
| <b>Virginia</b><br>(continued)                | Graduation Rate<br>Academic Trend Data<br>CTE<br>Certifications/Competencies  |   | science, history)—33%<br>College and Career Readiness (graduation rates, advance coursework completion, etc.)—25%<br>Participation in dual-credit and Career and Technical Education (CTE)—8%<br>Overall Growth toward College and Career Readiness—17%<br>Growth toward College and Career Readiness among at risk students—17%   |
| <b>West Virginia</b><br>(Effective 2015-2016) | Assessment Scores/Student Achievement<br>Achievement Gap Closure<br>Growth/Academic Progress<br>Academic Progress of Lowest Quartile<br>Graduation Rate | Proficiency Scale (Levels Not Readily Available)—scores assigned based on percentage of students who demonstrate proficiency on state tests | Elementary and Middle Schools—1000 points possible:<br>Mathematics and English Proficiency Rate—400 points<br>Observed Growth (Mathematics and English)—200 points<br>Adequate Growth (Mathematics and English)—200 points<br>Improved Performance of Lowest 25% (Mathematics and English)—200 points<br>High Schools—1200 points possible:<br>Mathematics and English Proficiency Rate—400 points<br>Observed Growth (Mathematics and English)—200 points<br>Adequate Growth (Mathematics and English)—200 points<br>Improved Performance of Lowest 25% (Mathematics and English)—200 points<br>Graduation Rates—200 points |

## Notes and References

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- 1 For detailed information about state accountability systems, see:  
Education Commission of the States (2013, December). School accountability “report cards.” Denver: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/MBquest3RT?Rep=ar10>.
- 2 Controversy has followed A-F accountability systems. For discussion of *Martinez v. New Mexico*. See:  
Ujifusa, A. (2014, April). A-F school grading targeted in N.M. equity suit. *Education Week*. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/04/23/29funding.h33.html>  
(in print as: N.M. lawsuit puts A-F school grading at center of funding-equity debate; 33 (29), 18-19).  
Plaintiffs there argue, among other claims, that the New Mexico A-F accountability system works to separate the neediest students from good teachers.
- 3 For additional information about the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), see:  
Florida Department of Education (n.d.). Opportunity scholarship program FAQs. Tallahassee, FL: Office of Independent Education and Parental Choice; Florida Department of Education. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/osp/faqs.asp>.  
The OSP as initially implemented allowed students to enroll in participating private schools. The Florida Supreme Court declared the OSP private school option unconstitutional in 2006. See:  
Dillon, S. (2006, Jan. 6). Florida Supreme Court blocks school vouchers. *The New York Times*. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/06/national/06florida.html>.
- 4 For detailed information about Indiana School Accountability, see:  
Ind. Code IC § 20-31-9 (Office of Code Revision, Indiana Legislative Services Agency {2010}). Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/2010/title20/ar31/ch9.html>.  
IC 20-31-9-4 details state intervention into schools that have received six consecutive “F” grades.
- 5 For a list of Indiana participating choice schools, see:  
Indiana Department of Education (2014, Dec. 24). Participating schools. Indianapolis: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.doe.in.gov/choice/participating-schools>.
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Meens, D., & Howe, K. (in press). NCLB and its wake: Bad news for democracy. *Teachers College Record*.
- 7 See:  
Figlio, D.N., & Lucas, M.E. (2004). What’s in a grade? School report cards and the housing market. *The American Economic Review*, 94(3), 591-604.
- 8 Foundation for Florida’s Future (2014). Florida formula for student achievement; school grades Q&A. Tallahassee, FL: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from [http://www.afloridapromise.org/Pages/Florida\\_Formula/Facts\\_on\\_the\\_FCAT\\_and\\_Floridas\\_Path\\_to\\_Success/School\\_Grades\\_Q\\_and\\_A.aspx](http://www.afloridapromise.org/Pages/Florida_Formula/Facts_on_the_FCAT_and_Floridas_Path_to_Success/School_Grades_Q_and_A.aspx).

- 9 Arizona Department of Education (2013, July 30). *The A-F letter grade system*. Phoenix: Author, 12. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.azed.gov/research-evaluation/files/2013/08/2013-a-f-letter-grades-guide-for-parents.pdf>.
- 10 Utah State Senate (2013). FAQs. *Utah school grading*. Salt Lake City: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://utahschoolgrading.com/faq/>.
- 11 Utah State Senate (2013). FAQs. *Utah school grading*. Salt Lake City: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://utahschoolgrading.com/faq/>.
- 12 Utah State Senate (2013). FAQs. *Utah school grading*. Salt Lake City: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://utahschoolgrading.com/faq/>.
- 13 Utah State Senate (2013). FAQs. *Utah school grading*. Salt Lake City: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://utahschoolgrading.com/faq/>.

See also the video embedded at:

Utah State Senate (2013). School grading 101. *Utah school grading*. Salt Lake City: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://utahschoolgrading.com/101/>.

- 14 Indiana Department of Education (n.d.). *A-F school accountability FAQ*. Indianapolis: Author, 1. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.svcs.k12.in.us/Downloads/revise-f-faq-101712.pdf>.
- 15 West Virginia Department of Education (n.d.). *West Virginia's A through F school grading system FAQs*. Charleston, WV: author, 1. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2014, from [http://static.k12.wv.us/a-f/a-f\\_faqs\\_flyer.pdf](http://static.k12.wv.us/a-f/a-f_faqs_flyer.pdf).
- 16 For Students First A-F grades and GPA scores, see:  
Students First (2014). *State Policy Report Card 2014*. Sacramento, CA: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2014, from <http://reportcard.studentsfirst.org/>.  
For grade and GPA methodology, see:  
Students First (2014). 2014 SPRC Methodology. *State Policy Report Card 2014*. Sacramento, CA: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2014, from <http://reportcard.studentsfirst.org/assets/2014Methodology.pdf>.
- 17 Students First (2014). Pillar: Empower Parents. *State Policy Report Card 2014*. Sacramento, CA: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2014, from [http://reportcard.studentsfirst.org/policy/empower\\_parents/empower\\_parents\\_with\\_information](http://reportcard.studentsfirst.org/policy/empower_parents/empower_parents_with_information)
- 18 Ladner, M., & Myslinksi, D.J. (2014). *Report card on American education*. Arlington, VA: American Legislative Exchange Council, 2.
- 19 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation (2013, January). *An examination of the Oklahoma state department of education's report card*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERÉ;  
The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation. (October 2013). *Oklahoma school grades: Hiding "poor" achievement*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERÉ.
- 20 The Ohio A-F accountability system does not yet assign single composite letter grades to express school quality. Single letter grades will be assigned to schools beginning in 2016. Now the Ohio A-F system assigns a variety of letter grades to schools for different outcomes: achievement, progress, graduation rate, gap closing, and so on.
- 21 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation (2013, January). *An examination of the Oklahoma state department of education's report card*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERÉ, 12.

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- 24 In Oklahoma, 33% of the grade is based on status achievement scores and another 34% is based on student growth as a function achievement scores. In all states in which we were able to determine the weightings, achievement scores are heavily weighed, accounting for a least 50% and often more. See the table for more detail.
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- 27 Coleman, J.S., Campbell, E.Q., Hobson, C.J., McPartland, J., Mood, A.M., Weinfred, F.D., & York, R.L. (1966). *Equality of Educational Opportunity*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare.
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- Rowan, B., Correnti, R., & Miller, R. (2002). What large-scale survey research tells us about teacher effects on student achievement: Insights from the Prospects Study of Elementary Schools. *Teachers College Record*, 104(8), 1525-1567;
- Nye, B., Konstantopoulos, S., & Hedges, L.V. (2004). How large are teacher effects? *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 26(3), 237-257;
- Rockoff, J.E. (2004). The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence from panel data. *The American Economic Review*, 94(2), 247-252.
- 30 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation (2013, January). *An examination of the Oklahoma state department of education’s report card*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERE, 5.
- 31 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation (2013, January). *An examination of the Oklahoma state department of education’s report card*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERE, 15.
- 32 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation (2013, October). *Oklahoma school grades: Hiding “poor” achievement*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CERE, 8.
- 33 See Mikulecky, M., & Christie, K. (2014). *Rating states, grading schools: What parents and experts say states should consider to make school accountability systems meaningful*. Denver, Co: Education Commission of the States, 9-13.

- 34 The Oklahoma Center for Education Policy and The Center for Educational Research and Evaluation. (2013, January). *An examination of the Oklahoma state department of education's report card*. Norman and Stillwater, OK: OCEP and CER, 18.
- 35 For detailed information about A-F school grade measures in each state, see:  
Education Commission of the States (2013, December). *School accountability "report cards."* Denver: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/MBquest3RT?Rep=ar10>.
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Students First (n.d.). *Empowering parents with data: School report cards*. Sacramento: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from [http://edref.3cdn.net/7f6ad0c1a7ad374cof\\_com6idps5.pdf](http://edref.3cdn.net/7f6ad0c1a7ad374cof_com6idps5.pdf).
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Arizona Department of Education (2013, July 30). *The A-F letter grade system*. Phoenix: Author, 12. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.azed.gov/research-evaluation/files/2013/08/2013-a-f-letter-grades-guide-for-parents.pdf>.
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Utah State Senate (2013). FAQs. *Utah school grading*. Salt Lake City: Author. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://utahschoolgrading.com/faq/>.
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- 40 Rhodes, J.H. (2014). Learning citizenship? How state education reforms affect parents' political attitudes and behavior. *Political Behavior* (forthcoming), 3.
- 41 Rhodes, J.H. (2014). Learning citizenship? How state education reforms affect parents' political attitudes and behavior. *Political Behavior* (forthcoming), 3.
- 42 A-F school grading systems meet many of Rhodes' criteria for determining which accountability systems count as "highly developed" and thereby suppress parental participation. These highly developed accountability systems include: (1) school ratings to measure school performance, (2) a statewide student-identification system, allowing the state to link student test scores with schools or teachers, (3) rewards for high-performing or improving schools, (4) assistance to low-performing schools, and (5) sanctions for lower-performing schools. Thus Rhodes' arguments apply broadly to A-F systems.
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Indiana Department of Education (n.d.). *A-F school accountability FAQ*. Indianapolis: Author, 2. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2015, from <http://www.svcs.k12.in.us/Downloads/revise-d-f-faq-101712.pdf>.
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