



## Section III

# Privacy and Data Security Issues to Consider Before Adopting a Digital Platform or Learning Program

Faith Boninger and Alex Molnar  
University of Colorado Boulder

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When schools import proprietary digital technologies, there is a risk that the companies involved may exploit student data. Any app or website can easily incorporate technology to collect IP addresses and other information, including which pages, content or ads children see or click on; what they download; what games they play; what device a child is using, with what operating system and settings, and so on. Educational technology platforms, particularly those from companies with contracts defining them as “school officials,” can access even more data, including data from school data systems.<sup>1</sup> Given the economic value of data in the surveillance economy, any bit of information that can be collected is collected.<sup>2</sup> Such comprehensive information facilitates behavioral tracking, which can be used in current and future product-related research, as well for other unspecified purposes.<sup>3</sup>

Schools and districts now routinely collect, store, and report data for state longitudinal data systems on such things as attendance, tardiness, test scores and grades. Teachers record student behavior in classroom management applications and use “personalized” or “adaptive” learning technologies that record student keystrokes, answers, and response times as they work their way through the curriculum or take assessments.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Department of Education actively encourages the use of massive student data sets (commonly referred to as “big data”<sup>5</sup>) to facilitate technological “innovation” on the largely unsubstantiated premise that it will lead to “deeper learning” and better assessment and support systems.<sup>6</sup>

While such massive amounts of specific and personal data are being collected about children at school, it is rarely clear how all this information may be used in the future. It may be used to support student learning or direct students to resources. It may also be used to manipulate students, cultivate them as current and future consumers, or sort and evaluate them for purposes unknown and unapproved by their schools or parents.<sup>7</sup> Corporations that gather

information from children in an educational context may claim not to use it for commercial gain, but there are no guarantees.<sup>8</sup> A 2018 Fordham Law School study of data brokers' sale of student lists found a wide variety of student information for sale—including a list of 14- and 15-year-old girls for family planning purposes.<sup>9</sup> The researchers were largely unable to discover the sources of the data for sale.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission noted that the resale of data is so common that it may be virtually impossible for consumers to determine the origin of any commercially available information about them.<sup>11</sup>

School contracts with digital vendors often include provisions that prohibit selling or transferring data, or using the information for purposes other than its stated educational use. However, those provisions can often be insufficient to actually protect the data from misuse by the companies that collect it or by their partners.<sup>12</sup> And, since data are fungible, it would be surprising if some companies do not collect and conserve data in order to, for example, increase the company's value to a prospective buyer.

Data security is also a concern.<sup>13</sup> High-profile breaches and hacks demonstrate that many education technology applications lack adequate data security to protect the student data collected.<sup>14</sup> In a 2018 report, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noted that the “widespread collection of sensitive information by EdTech could present unique exploitation opportunities for criminals,” and that education technology connected to the internet could facilitate criminals’ access to data children’s devices collect for education purposes.<sup>15</sup>

Given the massive amounts of student data collected and the threats to student privacy that virtual technologies pose, it is essential for school leaders to carefully review the privacy implications and data safeguards of any digital platform or learning program being considered. Six key issues related to student privacy are discussed below.

### **Digital platforms and learning programs may share student data with third parties for unknown purposes, or in other ways fail to adequately protect student data.**

It is this simple: Data that are not collected and/or stored are not available for misuse or theft. For this reason, a product that collects minimal data is preferable to a product that collects more. Consider carefully whether the analytics a product offers are really necessary. Avoid the temptation to purchase a product that offers analyses that you do not want to use now, but “might” want in the future. To protect student privacy, it would be preferable to choose a product that avoids collecting any data that you do not have a specific, immediate, interest in having. As a side benefit, a “no-frills” product may be less expensive than a product containing bells and whistles you probably won’t use and that puts your students at greater risk.

Private vendors may have the slickest marketing materials, but they are not necessarily the best choice to provide virtual learning strategies. In their 2019 study of virtual schools, Miron and Elgeberi found that districts have been increasingly creating their own virtual and blended schools, and that those schools’ students perform better on state assessments than students attending charter virtual schools—especially compared to charter schools managed

by for-profit education management organizations.<sup>16</sup> Also, unlike private companies, school districts have no financial incentive to collect and store excess student data.

## **How proprietary digital platforms and learning programs operate is rarely, if ever, transparent.**

Algorithms are procedures for solving a mathematical problem in a finite number of steps.<sup>17</sup> In software applications they are the formulas that collect, sort, and organize data. The programming of privately developed algorithms is largely hidden from the public behind the legal veil of “proprietary information.” As a consequence, there is no way for either the individuals or the institutions to know what data are being collected or what is done with those data, except as the provider may choose to share that information.<sup>18</sup> Until regulators require that the programming in software products used by schools be transparent and reviewable, the ability of school leaders to learn how a product works is limited to their power to walk away from a deal unless they get the information and protections they demand. It is nonetheless important that school leaders make transparency an issue in any negotiation of the purchase of a digital platform or learning program.

## **The contract language associated with digital platforms and learning program requires expert review.**

In 2017, the Electronic Frontier Foundation researched the privacy policies of 152 education technology services used in schools. They found that only 118 of the 152 had published privacy policies. Especially important with respect to data security, of that 118, only 78 mentioned data retention policies and only 46 reported using encryption (and in the latter case, encryption tended to be mentioned with respect to billing information and not necessarily with respect to other stored student data).<sup>19</sup>

When privacy policies and terms of service do exist, they may contain clauses that sound reasonable on the surface but actually present a risk to students. The Terms of Service for the Summit Learning Program, for example, warn schools that their use of the services is entirely at their own risk, that there are no warranties whatsoever, and that they waive any right to a class action suit and agree in advance to binding arbitration.<sup>20</sup>

Our examination of platform privacy policies found vague disclosures of how the vast amounts of information collected from children and teachers would be used. The company Instructure, for example, uses the information collected from its virtual learning platform, Canvas, to improve websites, apps, and services, and to “personalize and improve” users’ experience with the platform. Companies may also share aggregated and so-called “de-identified” data without notice to users, despite evidence that such de-identified data is easily re-identified.<sup>21</sup> Pearson’s Schoolnet is designed to collect and hold data on every assessment children take in their classes and for district and state testing purposes, with no published privacy policy for parents to evaluate.<sup>22</sup> How data collected by these digital platforms may be used in the future is unknown.

We do have some hint, however, of the extent of the possibilities for exploiting student data. Companies using predictive analytics are already collecting and combining data from assorted sources (including insurance claims, digital health records, housing records, and personal information about a person's friends, family and roommates) for use in algorithms that produce "risk scores" to identify individuals at risk of opioid addiction or overdose. These scores are sold to doctors, insurers and hospitals to be used in their decision-making.<sup>23</sup> Further, several hundred education technology companies partner with Amazon Web Services (AWS) in an initiative called EdStart. Marachi and Quill noted that although these companies may promise compliance with U.S. data privacy laws, once data are collected and combined across international borders, companies may no longer be held to the laws of the country where the data were originally gathered. Stored in international servers, the data may be transferred or sold without any oversight.<sup>24</sup>

**Digital platforms and learning programs often send students to third-party sites whose content and privacy policies have not been adequately vetted.**

When children enter the Internet environment, even if they enter from a responsible site with a thorough and transparent privacy policy, they are quickly exposed to other commercial sites that may be less concerned about their privacy. As they move around the Internet, using educational sites and jumping off from them to surf or play on other sites, their activity is constantly tracked and recorded for future use.<sup>25</sup> Because these data are not part of the "educational record" protected under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), they may be used to target marketing to children and their families, or to build profiles that would be of interest to such potential purchasers as colleges, universities and businesses that seek to market products to students, as well as to potential employers or military recruiters.<sup>26</sup>

Digital educational technology provides the opportunity for students to take breaks by shifting to additional sites. But some products actively direct students to other sites.<sup>27</sup> Summit Learning and Canvas, for example, connect children to third-party sites (such as YouTube) that collect data for advertising purposes. Both Summit Learning and Instructure (Canvas's parent company) deny responsibility for any use a third party might make of children's or teachers' data. YouTube is not part of the educational suite of applications that Google offers to schools. The implication is that YouTube tracks users, regardless of whether they arrived at YouTube from an educational site or even from one of Google's educational applications. Parents are thus in the impossible position of being responsible for reviewing the lengthy and often incomprehensible privacy policies of the numerous third-party sites or agreeing to their terms with no understanding of the implications. They are then further responsible for independently negotiating with their schools and districts if they are unwilling to have their children be subject to policy provisions. This is literally impossible for virtually all parents.

Thus, when a cloud-based learning management system, such as Canvas, sends students to multiple third-party sites, multiple vendors gain access to student browsing information (e.g., what the students view and metadata about their interactions). This creates such a

complex set of dynamic relational data drawn from multiple sources that it is impossible for students or their families to verify or even be aware of data being circulated about them.<sup>28</sup>

### **“De-identified” student data can be easily re-identified.**

As noted above, the digital technology industry promotes data de-identification (also called anonymization) as the solution to concerns about tracking.<sup>29</sup> Even if student data is de-identified, however, students’ personally identifiable information (PII) may not be fully or permanently protected.

Using only de-identified behavioral tracking data, marketers can target a given computer’s user with advertisements and other communications geared specifically to appeal to and influence that user. Google, for instance, has repeatedly been accused of doing exactly this. The state of New Mexico sued Google in February 2020 for violating the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).<sup>30</sup> The suit accuses Google of using school-assigned Chromebooks and “G Suite for Education” accounts to illegally collect information including students’ online behavior, location, voice recordings, contact lists, and passwords. It further accuses Google of using the personal information it illegally collects for advertising purposes. When the child is the primary or only user of the device (as is certainly the case when that device is a school-assigned Chromebook, for instance),<sup>31</sup> marketers do not need student identification at all in order to target specific students.

This being the case, the editor of the trade publication *Advertising Age*, Ken Wheaton, bluntly called data de-identification “a load of horseshit . . . a clever bit of technical and verbal misdirection used by marketers and tech people to keep regulators at bay.”<sup>32</sup> He explains, “You might not know my name (but you probably do), but that hardly matters if you know every move I make, every breath I take.”<sup>33</sup>

Computer scientists and data experts have known for over a decade that complex de-identified datasets—such as student datasets—can easily be re-identified.<sup>34</sup> If a handful of datapoints in an de-identified dataset match a handful of datapoints in another, identified dataset, the de-identified data are no longer anonymous. For these reasons, school leaders should not be reassured by promises that student data is de-identified. Instead, they should ask questions about the nature and amount of de-identified data held by the vendor of any product they are considering, what those data are used for, how they are protected from misuse and theft, and how and when they will be destroyed.

### **Digital platforms and learning programs may not adequately secure student data.**

It is more effective, but more expensive and therefore less common, to incorporate security into technology development from the beginning of a project rather than at its end.<sup>35</sup> It is also expensive, and therefore less common, to correct issues that may be unearthed by an algorithmic audit. For these reasons, the number of security breaches in public schools is growing. The Cybersecurity Research Center counted 348 cybersecurity incidents in 2019

alone, nearly three times as many as were reported in 2018.<sup>36</sup> Approximately half of these incidents resulted from the actions of insiders to the school community, primarily education technology vendors.<sup>37</sup>

Current legal protections for student privacy are extremely limited.<sup>38</sup> Federal law theoretically prohibits the use of data held by private companies for purposes unspecified in their contracts,<sup>39</sup> and over 425 companies have signed onto a self-regulatory pledge that bans “behavioral targeting of advertisements.”<sup>40</sup> Companies are, however, unlikely to be held to account for security breaches or for misuse of children’s data. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) threatens to withhold funding to schools as a result of data misuse, but this punishment has never actually been imposed.<sup>41</sup> A November 2018 audit found not only a two-year backlog in the Department of Education’s Privacy Office’s processing of FERPA complaints, but also that the Privacy Office is unable to resolve many of the complaints because of “significant control weaknesses” and unresolved policy questions about FERPA.<sup>42</sup>

Citizens may bring complaints to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) if they believe a signatory company has violated the Student Privacy Pledge. Like the U.S. Department of Education, however, the FTC seems disinclined to act decisively to censure technology companies. For example, it still has not acted on the 2015 complaint brought against Google by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.<sup>43</sup> It did, however, rule against Google in September 2019 for collecting personal information from children on YouTube in violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). In that case, the amount of the fine levied was the equivalent of less than three months of the advertising revenue Google makes from children’s videos, prompting critics to note that in effect, Google would not be discouraged from violating COPPA in the future.<sup>44</sup>

In many cases, state legislation designed to protect student privacy by prohibiting commercial use of student data explicitly exempts data collected from students for “adaptive” or “personalized” student learning purposes.<sup>45</sup> Such language nullifies other clauses of these bills designed to prevent tracking of students, because tracking is an essential aspect of “personalized” student learning. In other words, school and district leaders should hold any product they adopt to a higher standard than compliance with relevant state or federal privacy laws requires.

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Because of the ease with which de-identified data may be re-identified, data experts refer to “Five Safes” by which data can and should be secured: Data should be de-identified. Data collected should be analyzed only by trained and accredited specialists. Data analyses should be done in a secure setting. Data should be secured in a way that prevents unauthorized removal of any data. Data analyses done should be checked and confirmed as non-disclosive.<sup>46</sup> This framework used in government and research settings is designed to provide comprehensive and long-term integrity of any data collected. There is no legal requirement for private companies to use this framework, but to the extent that they do, students’ data will be more effectively protected.

## Research Landscape Related to Digital Platforms and/or Learning Programs in a Virtual Environment: Data Privacy

Michael K. Barbour, Touro University California

There has been no research in the field of K-12 distance, online, and blended learning focused on student data privacy practices beyond that of Boninger and her colleagues in 2019 and 2020.<sup>47</sup> The only other information available is from educational bloggers, investigative reporters, and whistleblowing teachers.

For example, in 2008, Arizona-based blogger David Safier revealed that the Arizona Virtual Academy (a K12, Inc.-managed virtual school) had outsourced the grading of middle school, and a year later high school, student papers to a private company based in India in an effort to cut costs.<sup>48</sup> According to Safier's reports, the practice was revealed when parents began to question the nature of comments on the students' work, and then began to complain to the virtual charter school (which appears to be when Safier first began investigating the issue). Safier questioned whether commenting on and/or scoring student work constituted direct or indirect teaching duties (Arizona law required that those with teaching duties had to obtain a Fingerprint Clearance Card or Fingerprint Criminal History Check).

In a follow-up to his original blog entry, Safier reported that in addition to the Arizona Virtual Academy, nine additional virtual charter schools operated by K12, Inc. (in California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington) also outsourced grading.<sup>49</sup> As a part of his second entry, he outlined exactly how the process worked, based on the evidence he was able to piece together. Several months later the story was picked up by *Education Week*,<sup>50</sup> but the story was not distributed by the media specifically in any of the affected states.

Five years later Travis Manning, a teacher activist, wrote a letter to the editor of the *Idaho Press* noting that the Idaho Virtual Academy was one of the nine other online charter schools operated by K12, Inc. that Safier had referred to in his original piece.<sup>51</sup> At the time of Manning's letter, the legislature in Idaho was debating K-12 virtual learning policy. In the months that followed, officials from both the Idaho Virtual Academy and K12, Inc. confirmed the story.<sup>52</sup>

Interestingly, the officials claimed that it had been a small pilot project that ended rather quickly. However, Safier's original investigation of the outsourcing detailed that the grading practice existed for at least 10 different K12, Inc.-operated virtual charter schools for at least two school years, and it also included tutoring services in four states (California, Colorado, Idaho, and Pennsylvania) for an unknown amount of time.

More recently, a group of teachers attempting to organize on behalf of the California Teachers Association lodged a number of complaints against the California Virtual Academies (virtual charter schools operated by K12, Inc.),<sup>53</sup> including that the cyber charter school "permitted overly wide staff access to sensitive student data, such as psychological reports and special education status."<sup>54</sup> However, the California Department of Education did not conduct an investigation and closed the matter due to a lack of data on the part of the complainants.<sup>55</sup> In 2016, the California Virtual Academy (2016) reported to their employees that they had "learned of an incident that might affect the security of your personal information,"<sup>56</sup> although there was no mention or additional coverage indicating that this breach may have impacted student data.

These kinds of reports are similar to those described in the Network for Public Education's 2018 guide, *Online Learning: What Every Parent Should Know*, as a part of a section entitled "Is Privacy Sufficiently Protected When Students Learn Online?"<sup>57</sup> The section details how in Pennsylvania, K12 Inc. was violating "federal privacy law by requiring parents who enroll their children to waive their rights to have their children's personal information protected from unrestricted disclosure and/or commercial use,"<sup>58</sup> as well as data breaches by companies like Schoolzilla and a growing number of schools and districts. However, beyond these isolated reports, there is no empirical research into privacy within the virtual education literature. Given this situation, it is incumbent on school leaders to thoroughly assess the potential risks to student privacy posed by any digital platform and/or learning program they are considering for adoption.

## Conclusion

Unfortunately, there are real risks to students' privacy posed by any collection of data about them. School and district leaders can minimize the risks by making judicious choices of platforms and programs. To avoid introducing significant privacy threats, we recommend that a school's educational program be the framework used to consider of any technology for adoption. In other words, technology and applications should not drive the curriculum, pedagogy, assessment, or data collection and record-keeping practices of the schools. We recommend that school and district leaders consider:

- The pedagogical values, goals, and practices they hope to achieve before considering the adoption of a particular digital educational product;
- The ways in which any digital educational product would advance their self-defined values, goals, and practices;
- The potential negative consequences—in this case, for student privacy—that may be associated with the use of that product and devise strategies for avoiding them;
- Which of their defined values, goals, and practices can be best achieved by non-digital means and which require digital means;

As they assess the suitability of any particular project, we recommend that they consider:

- The extent to which, and for what purposes, the product collects, stores, and shares student data;
- The transparency of the product's operation;
- The details of privacy-related contract language associated with the product;
- Whether and to which third-party sites the product directs students;
- What the product does with de-identified data; and
- How the collected data are secured.

## Notes and References Section III

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